One Enchanted Being:
Neuro-existentialism & Meaning
Owen Flanagan

The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World (RHP) is my attempt to explain whether and how meaning – existential meaning-- is possible in a material world, and how such

meaning is best conceived naturalistically. Meaning, existential meaning, must be conceived naturalistically, because supernaturalism despite whatever consolation it seems to afford,

provides answers to questions of meaning that are epistemically irresponsible, that show disrespect for truth. Neuro-existentialism conceives of our predicament in accordance with Darwin

plus neuroscience. We are animals, our minds are our brains, and when we die we are dead forever. If our situation is as neuroexistentialism says, then we have a new, deeper, more

truthful place, from which to ask Socrates question: How ought I to live? One answer befitting our natures is hedonistic platonism -- seek eudaimonia by maximizing the pure and mixed

pleasures produced at the fecund intersection of what is true, beautiful and good. If you try to do this, then you will have a shot at having about as good and meaningful a life as is in the

cards for a human. Many find the question of meaning as posed neuro-existentially deeply disturbing – it is a question about what sort of meaning befits an animal -- and the latter sort of

answer unsatisfying, underwhelming, disenchanting, possibly horrifying. My critics, Gregory Peterson (GP), Ann Taves (AT), and Donald Wiebe (DW), show great respect and patience for the

argument of RHP. Here I try to respond in kind to four of their (more than four) deep and insightful criticisms, several of which have worried me also, a couple of which I hear elsewhere and

often about my naturalization . Continue here